Citat:
Uporabnik Mr_Wolf pravi:
Nisem strokovnjak za letalstvo, sem pa gledal tisti doku o Heliosovi nesreči.
Tam ni bilo nobene dekompresije, laično povedano sta pilota, ali serviser, ki je pred letom nekaj delal na letalu, pozabila izključiti "notranje kroženje zraka" in so, banalno povedano, enostavno "podihali" ves kisik v letalu, preden je kdorkoli ugotovil kaj se spoloh dogaja.
To ni točno. Glej: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Helios_Airways_Flight_522
Citat:
When the aircraft arrived from London Heathrow earlier that morning, the previous flight crew had reported a frozen door seal and abnormal noises coming from the right aft service door, and requested a full inspection of the door.[2][8] The inspection was carried out by a ground engineer who then performed a pressurization leak check. In order to carry out this check without requiring the aircraft's engines, the pressurisation system was set to "manual". However, the engineer failed to reset it to "auto" on completion of the test.[9]
After the aircraft was returned into service, the flight crew overlooked the pressurisation system state on three separate occasions: during the pre-flight procedure, the after-start check, and the after take-off check. During these checks, no one in the flight crew noticed the incorrect setting.[10] The aircraft took off at 9:07[3] with the pressurisation system still set to "manual", and the aft outflow valve partially open.[11]
As the aircraft climbed, the pressure inside the cabin gradually decreased. As it passed through an altitude of 12,040 feet (3,670 m), the cabin altitude warning horn sounded.[3] The warning should have prompted the crew to stop climbing,[12] but it was misidentified by the crew as a take-off configuration warning, which signals that the aircraft is not ready for take-off, and can only sound on the ground.