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PUTIN'S REVENGE
Ankara wants to protect its allies in Azaz, hoping that it will be the base for reconquering IS territories in the eastern part of Aleppo province once the group is sufficiently weakened by Western coalition airstrikes. Otherwise, the PYD and/or the Syrian army will be the ones who benefit from the Islamic State's withdrawal.
The latter scenario is precisely what Vladimir Putin wants. Ever since Turkey shot down one of his bombers last month, he is bent on seeking revenge. Moreover, he already offered military support to the Kurds in September to help them link Afrin with Kobane by seizing Azaz and Jarabulus. The PYD then attempted to raise the stakes with their U.S. partner, but without success apparently. Earlier this month, however, Moscow delivered weapons to the 5,000 Kurdish fighters in Afrin, while Russian aircraft bombed a convoy of trucks that crossed the Turkish border into Syria at Bab al-Salam. Rebel positions north of Aleppo were struck as well, preparing the ground for an offensive by the Kurdish People's Defense Units (YPG), the PYD's main militia.
Of course, the Islamic State could seize the opportunity to overrun Azaz before the YPG. IS forces have already captured the village of Kafrah, only ten kilometers down the road from Azaz. It occupied the town a few months before the fratricidal fighting between rebel groups in winter 2014. But this does not bother the Russians or Assad, whose primary interest is to see the road between Aleppo and Turkey cut -- whether by IS or the PYD.
TURKISH INTERVENTION?
The Azaz corridor holds major strategic importance for Turkey, but will that be enough to spur direct intervention? If the corridor falls and Ankara fails to respond, rebel groups would interpret it as a sign of weakness, while the international community would view it as capitulation to Russia. With the Azaz border link closed, Russia could then help the Syrian army and its Shiite allies lock other Turkish crossing points between Bab al-Hawa and Jisr al-Shughour, effectively putting the entire province of Idlib in a net. This would mean a near total defeat for Ankara's Syria policy. And if the corridor's fall were accompanied by ethnic cleansing of the area's large Turkmen population (who are ethnic kinsmen of the Turks) or IS violence against civilians, Turkish public opinion would be further riled up.
Does Putin underestimate Turkey's offensive capacity? Thus far, the Turkish army has refused to send ground troops into Syria; the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) is the agency in charge of Turkish operations there. Russia's presence will remain the main deterrent to large-scale Turkish intervention, though Ankara would likely escalate indirectly to prevent the corridor's fall. Then again, Putin may well want Turkey to intervene directly against the PYD, since that could force the Kurdish group to join the Russian alliance and deprive the West of its only efficient actor on the ground against IS. To avoid this disaster, Western countries should send ground troops to occupy strategic locations such as Azaz and fight IS directly.
